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by Joëlle Long
i
1. Introduction 
The protection of adults who have become dependent upon others because of an impairment or insufficiency of 
their personal faculties has increasingly gained the attention of the international community. In 2000, the Hague 
Conference replaced a previous Convention dating back to 1905 with a new Convention on the protection of ‘adults’. 
Although the new instrument, which severs the symmetry between incapacitation and protection (see section 5 below), 
does not refer to incapacity or vulnerability, the purpose remains the safeguarding of adults ’who are not in a position to 
protect their interests’. In 2006, the United Nations prepared for signature the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities which details the rights of persons with ‘long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 
which… may hinder their participation in society’ and sets out a code of implementation. In 1999 and 2009, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted two specific recommendations: Recommendation No. R (99) 
4 on ‘the legal protection of adults’ and Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)11 ) regarding the ‘continuing powers of 
attorney and advance directives for incapacity’ . 
 
This article focuses on the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults which entered into 
force on 1 January 2009 and aims at enhancing the protection of adults who, by reason of an impairment or 
insufficiency of their personal faculties, are not in position to protect their interests, by harmonizing conflict of laws 
rules and creating a system of co-operation between central authorities of the member states (art. 1 para. 1). Despite the 
recommendation of the European Parliament that it should be ratified,
2
 the Convention has so far been ratified only by 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (where, however, it 
applies only to Scotland).  
 
The article argues that, although its scope is limited to private international law, this international instrument also 
interacts with substantive law. First, it reflects the principles and values underlying ‘vulnerable adults’ law’ in the 
majority of the countries represented in the Drafting Commission.
3
 In addition, it exerts indirect influence on domestic 
substantive law
 
both by promoting the worldwide circulation and acceptance of these principles (see Borrás: 2000) and 
by encouraging the convergence of the two different approaches to the protection of vulnerable adults which seem to 
characterize Western legal tradition. One approach is traditionally centered on tutors and curators, appointed by courts 
in order to replace or to assist the person in the performance of legal acts. The other is focused on personal autonomy 
and self-determination and therefore on the individual’s right to appoint an agent to protect his or her personal and 
economic interests in the event of a future incapacity.  
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This ‘indirect influence’ of the 2000 Convention on substantive law is essentially determined by: a) the 
codification (for the first time in an internationally binding instrument) of the principle of the (best) ’interests of the 
vulnerable adult’; b) a wide notion of ‘vulnerability’; c) the dissolution of the symmetry between the protection of the 
frail adult and his or her incapacitation; and d) the preference for advance planning for incapacity.  
 
In the following paragraphs I describe the two different approaches to vulnerable adults protection in Western 
legal tradition. I then examine how the 2000 Hague Conference interacts with these models. , arguing that, although it is 
certainly true that caution should be used when trying to derive substantive law consequences from private international 
law, the dynamic interactions between conflict of laws rules and substantive law should also be considered positively, 
especially in fields, like family law and vulnerable persons’ law, which are strongly influenced by ethical values and 
social norms. 
2. A comparative perspective 
A. A two-level system of protection 
 In Western legal systems the protection of vulnerable adults is generally structured on two levels.A first level, common 
to basically all jurisdictions, allows the person unable to understand and make his own decisions because of a mental 
disability or temporary conditions (e.g. drug addiction or abuse of alcohol) to obtain an ex post judicial declaration of 
invalidity of the single unilateral act or contract already concluded.
4
 The law sometimes requires evidence that the 
contracting partner was aware that the person lacked capacity.
5
 In England and Wales, regardless of the validity of the 
contract, the person providing goods or services can claim a reasonable price if the goods or services are ‘necessary’ for 
the actual requirements of the person.
6
 
A second level provides general protective measures available ex ante that apply before the vulnerable person 
performs any act harmful to his or her interests. There are two different ways in which this general and preventive 
protection can be granted.  
a) The intervention of courts 
A first model, which includes continental European countries as well as Scotland, is based on the intervention of 
courts, which deprives or limits the person of unsound mind of his or her legal capacity to act and exercise rights 
(capacità di agire, capacité d’éxercice, capacidad de obrar, capacidade de exercício, Handlungsfähigkeit) followed by 
the appointment of  a representative who acts as his or her substitute or, less frequently, of an assistant who participates 
in the performance of all or some acts predetermined by the law (Pousson-Petit, 1995). In Portugal, for instance, the 
system works with a major measure, the interdição
7
  and a subsidiary measure, the inabilitação
8
  that applies if and 
when the mental impairment is not as severe as to justify the interdição (see Pais de Vasconcelos, 2005: in part.117 ff.). 
In Scotland, the Adults with Incapacity Act 2000 allows others to make decisions on behalf of adults who lack capacity, 
provided that the authorized person acts in compliance with the principles established by the law. Public bodies monitor 
the actions of those authorized to decide on behalf of persons with incapacity. 
 
In civil law countries this paternalistic approach can be traced back to the ‘interdiction’ of artt. 489 ff. of the 
Napoleonic Code and ultimately originates from the curia furiosi of Roman Law. It is grounded on the idea that 
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‘lunatics’, like children, do not know what is best for them. This symmetry between legal protection of minors and the 
protection of vulnerable adults is still present in many national laws. The Portuguese Civil Code expressly states that the 
person under interdição is ‘equivalent to a minor’ and that, consequently and with the necessary limitations, the 
provisions concerning guardianship of children also apply to adults.
9
 The Italian Civil Code states that the rules 
governing guardianship and emancipation of minors apply respectively to adults under interdizione and inabilitazione.
10
 
According to the Estonian Family Law Act, the provisions regulating guardianship over a child also apply to 
guardianship over an adult.
11
 
 
During the 19
th
 century and the first half of the 20
th
 century, the legal incapacitation of incapable adults was often 
accompanied by their physical segregation in asylums (Foucault, 1972). As the awareness of the importance of 
preserving the capacity and personal freedom of vulnerable adults grew, almost all countries using this paternalistic 
model (except, for example, Portugal or Croatia, where the law remains unchanged) reformed their systems (Pousson-
Petit, 2006; Doron, 2002). On the one hand, the protection was extended to causes of vulnerability other than lunacy: 
many national laws now provide protection for adults who are unable to take care of their interests as a consequence of 
any alteration of their personal faculties
12
  and sometimes contain express references to physical impairment.
13
 On the 
other hand, loss or limitation of legal capacity is no longer seen as the only instrument of protection and is, if applied, 
generally confined to single acts or groups of acts predetermined by courts (see section 5 below).  
 
In addition, several countries have introduced, alongside the traditional measures, a general measure aimed at offering 
assistance ‘à la carte’ (Lagarde, 2000: 162). Indeed, this new instrument is available both for adults who  lack capacity 
of understanding and those who have capacity but are vulnerable and, as a general rule, it does not deprive the person of 
his or her legal capacity to act. The French sauvegarde de justice (‘judicial protection’) was introduced by loi n° 68-5 of 
3 of January 1968 and was recently modified by loi n°2007-308. Unlike the traditional instruments of tutelle and 
curatelle, which protect the adult who needs to be represented or assisted in the performance of legal acts, the new 
measure applies to persons who need a temporary patrimonial protection (art. 433 French Civil Code); the adult under 
sauvegarde retains the exercise of his rights, with the exception of those for which a special agent has been 
designated.
14
In Italy, the amministrazione di sostegno  (‘administration of support’) was introduced in 2004 and protects 
the personal and property interests of the vulnerable person through the judicial appointment of an administrator 
(amministratore di sostegno) who, temporarily or indefinitely replaces or assists the vulnerable adult in the performance 
of the single acts listed in the judicial decree of appointment. Unlike the interdizione, which completely deprives the 
adult of his legal capacity, the amministrazione di sostegno limits incapacitation to the acts listed in the decree of 
appointment of the agent. 
15
In Spain, the Ley 41/2003 de 18 de noviembre introduced the patrimonio protegido 
(‘protected assets’”). The new instrument offers protection to physical or mentally disabled persons by allowing them to 
keep a certain pool of assets separate from the rest of their wealth, with the aim of ensuring him or her a certain degree 
of quality of life in the future . 
 
In contrast, another group of countries rejected the old model by abolishing the traditional institutions. The first 
country to eliminate the old protective measures in favour of a new comprehensive one was Austria where the 
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Sachwalterschaft was introduced in 1984 to protect a mentally disabled person who was unable to look after his or her 
interests by the appointment of an agent. 
16
 In Sweden, two forms of protection were introduced: the designation of a 
‘god man’ acting on behalf of the vulnerable adult, who keeps his legal capacity to act; and the forvalarskap, which is 
the appointment of an administrator or trustee for several circumscribed areas (ING, 2009; Doron, 2002). In Germany, 
the Betreuungsgesetz of 12 December 1990 repealed the long-standing Vormundschaft (‘Guardianship’) of §§ 1773 ff. 
German Civil Code and introduced the Betreuung (‘Care and control’) as a general measure of protection for vulnerable 
adults. The Betreuung does not necessarily deprive or limit a person’s legal capacity and is flexibly tailored to his or her 
needs.
17
 In Greece, the new measure is the ‘judicial assistance’ introduced by law 2447/1996 in artt.1666-1688 of the 
Greek Civil Code. It replaced both ‘judicial interdiction’ and ‘judicial supervision’. The new assistance can be 
‘privative’, where the person is fully or partially deprived of her legal capacity so that the judicial assistant acts as a 
judicial representative,
18
 or ‘concurrent’, where the assistant must authorize all or some of the protected person’s acts.19 
The assistance can also be a combination of the previous two.
20
 In Switzerland there will soon exist only one 
comprehensive protective measure: the ‘curatela’ (or curatelle or Beistandschaft). 21 
  
b) The autonomy approach 
A second approach traditionally focuses on the autonomy of the vulnerable person, probably originating from the 
ethical principle of individual responsibility which was a significant feature of the Protestant Reformation.  
 
Every adult whose capacity has been duly assessed has the right to give advance directives regarding the type of 
medical care desired if he or she becomes incapable of making such decisions (for an overview of the relevant 
legislation in England and Wales, see Maclean, 2008). In addition, he or she can appoint a representative  (‘attorney’) to 
make decisions on financial and property matters and/or his or her health and personal welfare in the event of future 
incapacity. In England and Wales, this latter institution is the ‘Lasting Power of Attorney’ (Mental Capacity Act, 2005). 
In Ireland it is the ‘Enduring Power of Attorney’ (Powers of Attorney Act, 1996). 
The legal document which appoints the ‘attorney’ specifies the group of decisions that the person wants to be taken on 
his or her behalf in case he or she loses the capacity to act (e.g. property and affairs; personal welfare). It further 
contains the criteria to be followed by the attorney when taking these decisions. The health and welfare Lasting Power 
of Attorney (LPA) can only be used once the donor (the person needing help) is unable to take his own decisions. 
22
  
Since the Lasting or Enduring Power of Attorney involves the transfer of considerable powers to the attorney, 
the law establishes a number of legal safeguards. 
In England and Wales, a person who has either known the donor personally for a minimum period of 2 years, or has the 
relevant professional skills and expertise (e.g. doctor or a solicitor) has to certify that the donor understands the purpose 
and contents of the LPA and is not being influenced into giving it. Also, the Lasting Power of Attorney has to be 
registered with the Office of the Public Guardian which checks the application to make sure the legal requirements are 
met. In any case, a personal welfare LPA can be exercised by the attorney only after a person has lost capacity.  
 
In Ireland the procedure for executing the enduring power of attorney (EPA) requires the involvement of a 
solicitor and a doctor: the solicitor has to assess that the donor understands the effects of creating the power of attorney 
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and that he is not under undue influence; the doctor verifies that the donor has the mental capacity to understand the 
effect of creating the power at the time the document is executed. In addition, the EPA can only come into force if it has 
been registered with the High Court by the future attorney and only once a medical certificate states that the donor has 
already become or is becoming mentally incapable. The court has an extensive supervisory role with regard to the EPA. 
 
B. Circulation of models.  
These two approaches which apparently are very different from each other are increasingly converging. 
Most countries using the first model provide incapacity planning instruments. In some civil law systems, 
contractual agency (mandatum) is not extinguished by the incapacity of the principal
23
  so that this type of contract can 
be used to organize one’s care in case of future incapacity. In addition, many have introduced ad hoc instruments for 
adults to provide for their own future incapacity (Röthel, 2012). In 1989, the legislator of Québec created the mandat en 
prévision d’inaptitude (mandate in case of incapacity), a written document in which a person designates another who 
will act to protect his or her person and property in the event an illness or an accident temporarily or permanently 
deprives her of her faculties.
24
 In Germany, the Vorsorgevollmacht grants the power of attorney for personal and 
patrimonial care in the event of a future incapacity, avoiding the court procedures for the Betreuung. In Spain, the Ley 
41/2003 amended art. 223.2 Código civil stating that every person legally capable of acting can, for the event of a future 
incapacity, adopt any provision on his personal welfare and assets, including the appointment of an agent (Spanish 
writers call this instrument autotutela: Martínez Gallego, 2004: 146, 160 ff.). In France, the Loi n.2007-308 of 5th 
March 2007 portant réforme de la protection juridique des majeurs created a mandat de protection future (mandate for 
future protection) for appointing the person who will take care of the principal’s personal and economic affairs in the 
event of future incapacity.
25
 The Swiss legislature recently introduced the mandat pour cause d’inaptitude (mandate in 
case of incapacity), an instrument to empower a person or a legal entity to take care of the personal and economic 
interests of the principal or to be his or her representative in the event the principal loses mental capacity.
26
 
Conversely, the approach focused on personal self-determination is tempered by the parens patriae doctrine 
which allows the state, acting as parens patriae, to make decisions regarding mental health treatment on behalf of one 
who is mentally incompetent.  
This inherent jurisdiction of the courts to make decisions concerning children or adults who are not able to take care of 
themselves has been progressively supplemented by legislative acts that define the scope of the State intervention. As 
far as vulnerable adults are concerned, the Lunacy Act of 1890 gave courts the power to allow a relative or a friend to 
take charge of a lunatic and to make orders for the commitments of his or her estate. Now the Mental Capacity Act of 
2005 gives the Court of Protection the power to make the decision needed or to appoint a ‘Deputy’ to make decisions on 
behalf of the individual who has lost capacity and who has no lasting power of attorney in place (sect. 16). Besides, the 
analysis of the case law shows that the Mental Capacity Act gives the courts a wide margin of interpretation allowing to 
judge invalidate or make inapplicable advance directives if their implementation leads to consequences deemed 
unreasonable or inappropriate (Maclean, 2008: 21-22). Furthermore, the inherent jurisdiction is increasingly used not 
only where the vulnerable adult is disabled by mental incapacity, but also where the person has capacity but is unable to 
communicate his or her decision (Herring, 2009: 499). 
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3. The codification of the principle of the ‘interests of the vulnerable adult’. 
 
The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children mentions in its preamble the ‘best interests of the child’ as 
its guiding principle, repeatedly using it to allow the derogation of the general rule on jurisdiction (art. 8 paras.1 and 4,  
art. 9 para. 1, art. 10), to limit the effect of the public policy clause (art.22, art. 23 para.2, lett. d) and to guide the 
enforcement of protective measures abroad (art. 28).At first glance, the choice of the 2000 Convention seems more 
reticent: the ‘interests of the adult’ are expressly mentioned to a much lesser extent, namely to allow the derogation 
from general conflict of laws rules on the basis of the assessment of which law/jurisdiction betters suits that vulnerable 
person’s needs (art. 7 para. 1, art.8 para 1, art. 13 para. 227, art. 16). Besides, neither in the text of the 2000 Convention 
nor in its preamble refer to the ‘best’ interests of the vulnerable person, though the preamble states ‘that the interests of 
the adult and respect for his or her dignity and autonomy are to be primary considerations’ (my italics).
28 
 
This limited use of the ‘interests of the adult’ is probably due to the concern over the greater vagueness of the 
clause compared to the corresponding (best) ‘interests of the child’, whose content has been progressively  clarified 
both by national legislators and case law.
29
 According to the Drafting Committee, reference to the ‘best’ interests of the 
vulnerable adult was omitted since this adjective did ‘not add much of substance to the text’ and ’could be awkward in 
the event of a conflict between the interests which are equally respectable and best (for example, between the interests 
of the adult and those of a child)’ (Lagarde, 2003: para. 109). Moreover, it was argued that while the interests of 
children should clearly prevail over the competing interests of the parents, in the case of vulnerable adults there seem to 
be no counterparts (Borrás, 2002: 3).  
An in depth analysis of the 2000 Hague Convention shows that the ‘interests of the adults’ play a vital role, a) in 
concreto, as a tool to ensure ‘practical’ justice and b) in abstracto, as a guiding principle.  
 
a) As previously mentioned, the ‘best interests of the adult’ allow derogation from general conflict of laws rules 
in order to determine which law/jurisdiction better suits that vulnerable person’s needs. Thus the welfare of the 
vulnerable person prevails over both the general interest of the State in international harmony of decisions and the 
interests of other family members. This use in concreto of the clause seems to derive from the common law which tends 
to work with principles in order to ensure practical justice. Besides, it appears worth mentioning that in these countries 
the principle of the best interests of the vulnerable person has been accepted and codified only with reference to a 
person who ‘lacks capacity’ being ‘unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’.  
The underlying idea is that if the person has duly planned the care of his own interest in case of a future incapacity, a 
paternalistic approach is not justified. In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 authorizes substitute 
decision‐making in the ‘best interests’ of the person lacking capacity.30 The same Act, similarly to the approach with 
regard to the ‘best interests of the child’, lists the factors to be (and not to be) taken into consideration for the specific 
assessment of the best interest of the incapable person.
31
 
b) The principle of the (best) interests of the vulnerable adult also inspires in abstracto the choice of the grounds of 
jurisdiction and applicable law, as well as the automatic recognition of the protective measures abroad.Habitual 
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residence is chosen (art.5) because the State of residence is better placed to assess the factual life situation of the 
vulnerable person since it is ‘physically closer’ to her or him
32
. Other grounds of jurisdiction are established only when 
the authorities of those countries are deemed better prepared to assess the interest of the adult (artt. 7 para. 1 and 8 
paras. 1 and 2)
33
.  
Courts withg jurisdiction will apply their own laws since it is – as previously explained – the law which corresponds to 
the ‘territorial’ interests of the person and because it ensures that the judicial proceedings run smoothly  (and a 
reasonable duration is vital in family law proceedings since they affect personal interests). Only in exceptional cases 
and in so far as the protection of the person or property so requires, can the authorities exercising their jurisdiction apply 
or take into consideration the law of another State with which the situation has a substantial connection (art. 13 para.2).  
 
Aiming at ensuring the global protection of vulnerable persons, the Convention provides for the automatic 
recognition of protective measures abroad (art. 22). It encourages upholding the validity of acts granting power of 
representation for future incapacity, allowing however its withdrawal if it is not exercised in a manner sufficient to 
guarantee the personal and patrimonial interests of the vulnerable adult (art. 16).  
Also, the very mechanism of cooperation between central authorities set in the Convention seeks to ensure effective 
protection of vulnerable adults involved in cross border situations (artt.28 and ff.). 
 
This abstract use of the interests of the vulnerable adult’s clause is typical of civil law countries. Indeed, in these 
countries the principle of the (best) interests of the vulnerable adult has been guiding the transition (already completed 
in most of them) from a model of ‘care’, historically developed to protect public safety and the lunatic’s estate, to a 
system focused on the personal welfare and rights of the vulnerable person. The process started in the 1960s, with the 
growth of the idea that people with disabilities should be viewed as rights holders and not as mere ‘objects’ of charity, 
medical treatment and social protection. 
 
The principle of the best interests of the vulnerable adult was implemented in many domestic laws. So for 
example with regard to the requirements of necessity and subsidiarity of the protective measure ,
34
 its flexibility and 
proportionality, 
35
 and the ‘suitability’ with regard to taking care of the vulnerable person’s interests as the only factor 
to be considered when choosing the custodian.
36
Unlike France and Italy, which only refer to the ‘interests’ of the 
vulnerable adult,
37
 the German BGB expressly refers to the adult’s ‘best’ interests: ‘if the person of full age suggests a 
person who may be appointed custodian, this suggestion should be followed unless it is inconsistent with the best 
interests of the person of full age’;38 ‘the custodian must attend to the affairs of the person under custodianship in a 
manner that is conducive to his welfare. The best interests of the person under custodianship also include the faculty, 
within his capabilities, to shape his or her life according to his or her own wishes and ideas’.39The use of the ‘interests 
of the adult’ principle in the 2000 Convention is similar to the use of the ‘best interests of the child’ both in the 1961 
and in the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children: namely a ‘materialization’ of private international law 
rules which should be ’neutral’ according to the traditional approach, i.e. indifferent with regard to the result of the 
practical operation of the applicable law.
40
 Indeed, through the use of the (best) ‘interests’ clause, private international 
law is influenced by the principles underlying substantive law.  
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The gradual recognition of the value of respect for the individual led to the elucidation of so called third-generation 
human rights and to the state’s positive obligation to provide for a ‘special’ protection for those who are unable to take 
care of their own interests, as well as to respect their personal freedoms and self-determination. In fact, the clause of the 
best interests of the child was alleged to be vague, ambiguous and even ‘totally useless in practice’ (Donnier, 1959: 
180), but history shows the spread of common values in substantive law determined its success both in substantive law 
and later on in conflict laws, encouraging its use and gradually clarifying and harmonizing its contents.
41
 As far as 
vulnerable adults’ law is concerned, the (best) interests clause could prompt a reform in those systems which still lack 
flexible and tailored protective measures. Moreover, it encourages the countries belonging to the autonomy model both 
to assess whether the actions of the appointed attorney are in the vulnerable person’s interests and to create safeguards 
to protect vulnerable adults who have not planned  their own protection in the event of future incapacity.  
4. The wide notion of “vulnerability”  
The 2000 Hague Convention applies to the protection of adults who, ‘by reason of an impairment or 
insufficiency of their personal faculties are not in the position to protect their interests’ (Preamble and art.1 para. 1).  
A minority opinion states that this provision should (‘probably’) be interpreted in the sense that the Convention only 
covers ‘those who lack decision- making capacity’, excluding those merely affected by physical disabilities, since ‘on 
human rights grounds, compulsory measures of protection would not be justified in relation to persons who have full 
decision-making capacity’ (Clive, 2000: 5).42 
 
This view is probably attributable to the cultural background of Anglo-American countries where, despite the increasing 
use of the inherent jurisdiction (referred to earlier)  protective measures have long been available only for persons who 
lack capacity. For the following reasons, however, the idea of confining the scope of the Convention to people with 
mental disability cannot be shared.  
 
The Explanatory Report expressly states that ‘the adults whom the Convention is meant to protect are the 
physically or mentally incapacitated’.43 The choice of the international instrument not to restrict its scope to ‘mental’ 
impairment or insufficiency was intentional. A specific proposal by the UK delegation to clarify that ‘the incapacities 
within the scope of the Convention should not be sensory or physical but related to mental faculties or powers of 
communications’ was rejected by a large majority.44 Moreover, the underlying idea of the Convention is precisely that 
vulnerable adults’ protection does not necessarily coincide with incapacitation. Indeed, unlike the 1905 Convention, this 
international instrument does not require incapacitation for its application, since not every adult in need of protection is 
also incapable of understanding.  
 
In addition, even for a person of unsound mind, legal incapacitation is not always the best form of protection. 
This international instrument is not limited to protective measures which affect legal capacity such as guardianship and 
curatorship, the use of which would certainly violate the right to self-determination of a vulnerable person who is 
capable of understanding.
45
 Indeed, some measures of protection listed (for illustrative purposes) in art. 3 do not 
automatically lead to limiting the capacity to act (e.g. ‘assistance’, administration, conservation of the adult’s property). 
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This is why, from the very beginning of the drafting process, it was decided to avoid using the term ‘incapacitated 
adults’ and the very title of this international instrument shows that the ‘protection serves as guide and yardstick for 
defining the scope of application of the Convention… a  measure taken by the authority of a State falls or does not fall 
within the scope of the Convention depending on whether it is or is not aimed at the protection of adults’ (Lagarde, 
Explanatory Report, § 8). 
 
Doubts could also arise whether this international instrument covers vulnerabilities which do not strictly fall into 
the medical concept of psychological or physical ‘impairment’ or disability, such as age, squandering, drug addiction 
and alcoholism.  As is well known, the legal determination of a person’s decision-making ability is often complex, due 
to the number of personal conditions which can affect the capacity of understanding, as well as the existence of 
different degrees of capacity and the variability of the capacity over time and depending on the nature of the decision to 
be taken (Herring, 2008: 1619). 
According to the Explanatory Report, these vulnerabilities remain outside the scope of the Convention, since the 
‘impairment or insufficiency of personal faculties’ of art. 1 para. 1 as has to be interpreted as a ‘disease’. (Lagarde, 
Explanatory Report, § 9). Furthermore,  as the proceedings show, delegates from common law countries were 
concerned that prodigality and drug addiction should not be  covered by the Convention, as that would allow an undue 
restriction of a person’s freedoms (see Procès verbal N.1 Minutes N.1 Meeting of 20 September 1999, cit., p.223 f). 
Nevertheless, in favour of a broad functional idea of vulnerability regardless of any medical condition, it could 
be said that according to the title of the Convention and its underlying principle of the best interests of the vulnerable 
adult, emphasis should be placed on the effect and not on the cause. Hence, the Convention should apply to all ‘those 
who need protection’. The reference to ‘impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties’ should therefore be 
interpreted in the sense of excluding from the scope of this legal instrument vulnerabilities arising from external 
situations such as domestic violence (Explanatory Report, § 9). Besides, the proceedings show that the Special 
Commission of 1997 deemed the Convention should apply to ‘an adult whose impairment of personal faculties takes the 
form of prodigality’.46 Commenting the Convention, several authors state that it applies to the elderly who are incapable 
of taking proper care of their interests regardless of the existence of a pathology (Borrás, 2000: p.3; Durán Ayago, 
2004: 456). In any case, a ‘social’ and ‘functional’ idea of vulnerability would lead to a notion of vulnerability quite 
similar to that of ‘dependency’ in geriatric literature and thus reflect the social dimension of health in medical and 
sociological literature.
47
 
 
From a comparative point of view, two different approaches to vulnerability seem to exist. 
A first group of countries requires both a medical condition and the inability to take care of one’s own interests. 
Under the Mental Capacity Act, for instance, ‘a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain’ (Sect. 2(1), my italics). The French Civil Code requires a medical assessment of the 
physical or psychological ‘alteration’ which makes the person incapable of managing his or her affairs. In Germany, ‘if 
a person of full age, by reason of a mental illness or a physical, mental or psychological handicap, cannot in whole or in 
part take care of his affairs, the custodianship court, on his application or of its own motion, appoints a custodian’.48 In 
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Austria, the law establishes as a prerequisite for Sachwaltershaft that the person finds itimpossible to manage his or her 
own affairs due to a mental disability or impairment.
49
 
 
Other jurisdictions put a special emphasis on the result of the insufficiency of personal faculty, that is to say on 
the incapacity to protect one's own interests, considering the medical diagnosis of a ‘disease’ not always necessary. In 
Italy, for instance, courts grant the amministrazione di sostegno in every case of inability to provide for one’s interests 
without the necessity of a medical assessment of a disability or an infirmity, e.g drug addiction
50
, gambling addiction
51
 
and also, under certain circumstances like social isolation and illiteracy.
52
 According to Portuguese doctrine, the all-
encompassing care of interdicao can also be used in severe cases of prodigality, drug addiction and alcoholism (Pais de 
Vasconcelos, 2005: 117).  
Doubts can be raised on whether an interpretation of vulnerability covering not only medical conditions could 
jeopardize the recognition of the protective measure abroad. I do not think that after the ratification of the 2000 Hague 
Convention, this would be permissible.  
5. The dissolution of the symmetry between the protection of the vulnerable adult and his or her 
incapacitation 
One of the merits of the 2000 Hague Convention is undoubtedly the dissolution of the symmetry between the protection 
of the vulnerable adult and his or her incapacitation (Borrás, 2000: 3; Gonzáles Beilfuss, 2000:85). Hence, the 
protection of the vulnerable adult does not necessarily imply the limitation of his or her legal capacity. As the Council 
of Europe points out in its ‘Principles concerning the Legal Protection of Incapable Adults’ of 1999, protective 
measures ‘should include, in appropriate cases, those which do not restrict the legal capacity of the person concerned’ 
(principle n.2 para.4). 
 
As previously illustrated, a large group of countries, mainly from the civil law tradition, has long been 
characterized by the symmetry between the protection of vulnerable persons and their incapacitation.
53
 Indeed, the 
typical instrument for the protection of children and lunatics was the limitation of their legal capacity and the 
appointment of a representative: the children’s parents, or an agent, guardian or curator (see section 2 above).  
In order to protect the vulnerable person’s remaining capacity and personal freedoms, many civil law countries have 
been introducing new protective measures which do not necessarily limit the legal capacity of the vulnerable adult (see 
section 2 above). In Germany, the person under Betreuung retains full power to enter into legal transactions by himself, 
independently of the fact that the law gives the Betreuer the power of representation in judicial and extrajudicial matters 
(art.1902 BGB) and that the court could have given him additional rights (Gottwald, Schwab and Büttner, 2001: 
98).
54
The only limit is natural incapacity,  in compliance with the general rule of art. 104 para. 2 BGB. In Austria, 
France and Italy, the person placed under Sachwalterschaft, sauvegarde de justice or amministrazione di sostegno 
retains the legal competence to perform all acts not expressly attributed to the competence of the agent by the court 
55
.  
 
As far as private international law is concerned, in civil law countries, the traditional symmetry between protection and 
incapacitation justified the choice of the law regulating capacity in matters of vulnerable persons’ protection. Since 
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capacity was seen as belonging to the ‘personal status’ of the person, the chosen connecting factor used to be 
nationality. In fact, ab origine the connecting factor for ‘personal status’ (Hunter-Henin, 2004; Farge, 2003) was 
domicile, but it was replaced by nationality in art.3 of the Napoleonic Civil Code in application of the principle of 
sovereignty: the jurisdiction of the authorities and the application of the law of the State of origin were seen as 
fundamental aspects for the States’ control over its own citizens.56Signs of dissolution of the symmetry between the 
protection and the capacity of the vulnerable person have been present for a long time. Both in children’s law and in 
vulnerable adults’ law, habitual residence has progressively been chosen as connecting factor. Indeed, the 1902 Hague 
Conference on the Protection of Children and the 1905 Hague Conference on the Protection of Incapacitated Adults 
introduced habitual residence as a subsidiary criterion.
57
 Habitual residence became the main connecting factor in the 
1961 Hague Convention and in the 1996 Convention on the Protection of Children.
58
  As far as this latter Convention is 
concerned, another clear sign of the dissolution of this symmetry is the extension of its scope to protective measures 
which do not deprive or limit legal capacity,  like the continuous power of attorney and anticipated decisions. On the 
contrary, the 1905 Convention only applies to protective measure limiting or depriving the adult of legal capacity (see 
art. 13). 
 
In order to ratify the 2000 Hague Convention, several countries amended their domestic private international law rules. 
France amended art. 1211 of the Civil Procedure Code by Décret n.2008-1276 du 5 décembre 2008. Scotland 
introduced a provision on the point in Section 3 of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. A minority of legal 
systems already comply with the Convention’s choice of habitual residence as the main connecting factor. Switzerland, 
for instance, recently modified art.85 of the Federal Act of 18 December 1987 on private international law incorporating 
the 2000 Convention in the domestic system through a direct reference. The connecting factor, however, remains 
unchanged since the original text of the law declared the principles of the 1961 Hague Convention (and therefore the 
general criterion of habitual residence) applicable by analogy to adults’ protection. It is interesting to notice that in Italy, 
where the Convention has not yet been ratified, courts have already recalled its principles to recognize the jurisdiction 
of domestic courts and the application of Italian law for the protection by amministrazione di sostegno of a Moroccan 
citizen habitually resident in Italy
59
. 
6. The general preference for advance planning for incapacity  
According to the Preamble of the 2000 Convention, respect for the ‘dignity’ and ‘autonomy’ of vulnerable adults 
‘are to be primary considerations’. Thus, the preservation and enhancement of existing freedoms and capacity of the 
vulnerable adult is a guiding principle of the whole text. 
This goal to protect the individual’s self-determination is pursued on the one hand by a maximum preservation of 
capacity (and the consequent dissolution of the symmetry between protection and incapacitation, see section 5 above) as 
well as by procedural safeguards, mainly the vulnerable person’s right to be heard in the proceeding in which the 
measure of protection is chosen.
60
  
In addition, the Convention also promotes advance planning for substitute decision making and financial management 
in the event of a future incapacity (for some examples of delegation of decision making powers in domestic laws see 
section 2 above). This aim is achieved by encouraging the cross border recognition of the power of representation 
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granted by an adult, either by contract or by unilateral act.
61
 With the same purpose, the Convention recognizes the 
choice expressed by the adults as a subsidiary jurisdiction criterion.
62
  
 
Actually, the effects on substantive law would have been much more incisive if the proposal to grant the adult 
the right to choose any law, regardless of a specific connection with his or her situation, had been adopted. In Italy, for 
instance, the possibility (under art. 13 of the 1985 Hague Convention) to choose any law for the settlement of a trust led 
courts to admit also ‘domestic trusts;, hitherto unknown. A similar development could have taken place also with regard 
to different measures of protection unknown to certain ratifying states. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the 
rapporteur seemed to recognize an indirect substantive effect of art. 15 and 16 of the 2000 Hague Convention when he 
considered these provisions as a petit manuel (‘short handbook’) on the power of representation. 
 
Common law authors (Fagan, 2002) point out that the principle of mutual recognition of the powers of representation 
and consequently of advance medical directives, is threatened by the provision according to which ‘the manner of 
exercise of such powers of representation is governed by the law of the State in which they are exercised’. 63.In spite of 
this, the provisions on advance planning in the Convention are of great interest for countries which do not (yet) provide 
specific tools to plan for the management of personal, financial and legal affairs in the event of a future incapacity. 
Indeed, each person can designate his assistant or representative (amministratore di sostegno) for the event of future 
incapacity, but the court is not bound to appoint that very person if it thinks that it is not in the best interests of the 
person (art. 408 para. 1 Italian Civil Code). Thus, this instrument is very different from the mandates for future 
protection examined above (section2). 
Indeed, the 2000 Hague Convention compels all countries to become familiar with advance planning tools already 
existing in other countries, at least in cross-border situations. It is true that the Convention leaves it to the receiving 
State to govern the exercise of the power of representation conferred abroad, but, as illustrated above, it is clear that one 
of the objects of this international instrument is to ‘provide for the recognition and enforcement of…measures of 
protection in all Contracting States’.64 Moreover, the European Parliament expressly encouraged the ratification of the 
2000 Hague Convention, stating that the recognition abroad of ‘protection regimes’ is essential to ensure the free 
movement of persons and that therefore ‘the legal protection regimes must… have continued legal effect, not least to 
ensure the continuity of decisions taken at a judicial or administrative level, or by the person him/herself. Such is the 
case with incapacity mandates or future protection mandates, which it must be possible to apply throughout the 
European Union’. 65 
  
From a more general point of view, one could wonder whether the total lack of specific tools to plan for the 
organization of personal, financial and legal affairs in case of a future incapacity is consistent with the general system of 
protection of human rights. Indeed, the right to self-determination should be limited only if strictly necessary for the 
public interest or higher fundamental rights of other individuals. From this perspective, for instance, the Strasbourg 
Court of Human Rights found a violation of art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to private and 
family life) with regard to a person who under Croatian law had not been allowed to legally recognize his son since he 
had previously been divested of his legal capacity. According to the Court, ‘a fair balance has not been struck between 
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the public interest in protecting persons divested of their legal capacity from giving statements to the detriment of 
themselves or others, and the interest of the applicant in having his paternity of K. legally recognized’. 66  
7. Conclusion 
It is certainly true that caution should be used when trying to derive substantive law consequences from private 
international law. The aim of conflict of law rules is to regulate cross-border situations, resolving conflicts between 
legal systems with regard to jurisdiction, applicable law, as well as recognition and enforcement of measures taken by 
foreign authorities. Thus one of the main aims of the 2000 Hague Convention is, according to its Preamble, to avoid 
conflicts between legal systems in respect of jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of measures 
for the protection of adults. Moreover, in the traditional view, conflict of law rules are considered to be neutral, i.e. 
indifferent with regard to the practical results achieved by the identified substantive law (see section 3 above). Finally, 
it is argued that the ‘materialization’ of private international law threatens legal certainty because it reduces the clarity 
of the factors that determine the applicable law.  
 
Nevertheless, the dynamic interactions between private international law and substantive law should also be 
considered positively, especially in fields, like family law and vulnerable persons’ law, which are strongly influenced 
by ethical values and social norms. Indeed, private international law acts increasingly ‘import’ principles of substantive 
law and values shared by the majority of the Member States. A good example of this interaction between private 
international law and domestic substantive law is the principle of the ‘best interests of the child’ (see section 3 above). 
Another is the implementation of the material principles of European Union Law, such as the promotion of the internal 
market, the increase of legal security and the protection of the weaker party (e.g. consumer protection), in the new EU 
private international law (Weller, 2011: 429). 
 
Furthermore, recent international instruments formally classified as private international law are likely to affect 
also substantive law. The Convention of 29 May 1993 on Intercountry Adoption, although developed within the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, establishes a definition of adoption (art. 2 para.2), acknowledges the 
importance of preserving information about the child’ s origin (art. 30) and introduces procedural safeguards in order to 
ensure that cross-border adoptions take place in the best interests of the child, namely requiring an assessment by a 
public authority of the adoptability of the child (art. 4), as well as the evaluation of the suitability and eligibility of the 
perspective adopting parents (art.5). The same Council Regulation (EC) N. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters equalizes divorce, 
legal separation and annulment of marriage. This equalization is of great importance in countries, such as Italy, where 
the case law sharply distinguishes divorce from religious marriage annulments and from separation, excluding both lis 
pendens and the conflict of judgments which prevents the enforcement of a later decision of marriage breakdown 
between the same parties, with the consequence that, the divorce decision and its consequences on former spouses’ 
maintenance can be overcome by the later decision of enforcement of religious annulment (Long: 2007, 167 ff.).  
As has been shown in this article, the 2000 Hague Convention provides an interesting test case for substantive 
law. On the one hand, it promotes the further diffusion of principles already accepted by most states, namely the 
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principle of the (best) interests of the vulnerable adult, a notion of vulnerability that encompasses mental impairment, 
and the dissolution of the symmetry between protective measures and incapacitation. On the other hand, this 
international instrument encourages convergence of the two different approaches to vulnerable adults protection which 
characterize the Western legal systems by a) recognizing the importance of protective measures in favour of vulnerable 
adults through their automatic recognition abroad and b) by compelling countries traditionally centred on tutors and 
curators to become familiar with advance planning tools already existing in other countries. 
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